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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vJOHNNIE

Case No. 16132

MICHAEL CHAVEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged by Information with the crimes of
Manslaughter and Automobile Homicide arising out of an automobile
accident on July 21, 19 77.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The matter was tried before the Honorable Ernest F.
Baldwin, Jr. sitting with a jury, on March 27, 28, and 29, 1978.

The case was sent to the jury on the charge of Automobile Homicide
and appellant was found guilty of that offense.

Thereafter, appellant

was committed to the Utah State Prison for the term provided by
law, zero to five years.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
him.

Appellant seeks the reversal of the conviction against
In t h e alternative, appellant seeks a new trial and that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

appellant be properly sentenced.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On July 21, 1977, at 10:45 p.m. at 3900 South State

Street in Salt Lake County, appellant was involved in an automobile
accident with another automobile driven by Gunnar Skollingsberg
(R. 219, 220, 361, 362).

In the Skollingsberg vehicle was 26 month

old Eric who died as a result of head injuries suffered in the
accident.
Mr. Skollingsberg testified he was southbound on State
Street, stopped for a red light in the left turn lane, then turned
left, or east, onto 3900 South when his car was hit by an automobile
coming north on State Street (R. 220-229).

Mr. Skollingsberg said

his left turn light was green when he last saw it (R. 229).
Other persons at the intersection said appellant's
automobile was going north on State Street in the eastern most part
of the road, at a high rate of speed when the two cars collided
(R. 247, 265).

The automobile driven by appellant was in what is

used as a right turn lane, a cement gutter portion of the road,
not designated as part of the road but used frequently by automobile
traffic and buses (R. 249, 354).

There were skid marks shortly

before the point of impact (R. 326).
Appellant was arrested near the accident scene, walking
briskly, and was administered first aid for his injuries, and taken
to a hospital (R. 304, 309).

The arresting officers said they

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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smelled the odor of alcohol on appellant, but made no other observations of him other than that appellant was "upset" (R. 305, 313).
At the hospital appellant told the officer that the
light was green for him (R. 313, 323).

Samples of blood were taken

from appellant at 12:14 a.m. and 12:48 a.m. on July 22, 1977 (R. 372,
373, Exhibits ll and 12).

Lynn Davis, a chemist, performed tests

on appellant's blood samples and determined the blood alcohol level
to be 0.19 for each of the two tests (R. 396, Exhibits ll and 12).
Bryan Finkle, a pharmacologist, said that given the facts he had,
and assuming the last drink of alcohol was 10: 30 p. m. on July 21,
1977, the blood alcohol level would have been between 0. 05 and 0. 08
at 10:45 p.m., the time of the accident (R. 459).
None of the arresting officers, or others who had contact with appellant at the accident scene or the hospital, were
asked for, nor did they render, an opinion as to whether appellant
was under the influence of alcohol.

Eppie Duran, who was with

appellant before and during the accident, said appellant was "not
, unusual" in his behavior, but he told appellant to slow down (R. 362).

- 3 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT BELOW ERRED BY INSTRUCTING THAT AN
ELEMENT OF AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE WAS NEGLIGENCE
AND THE COURT PROPERLY SHOULD HAVE INSTRUCTED
THE JURY THAT CRIHINAL NEGLIGENCE IS REQUIRED
TO SUSTAIN A CHARGE OF AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE.
Appellant was charged in one count of the Information
with Automobile Homicide.

Appellant contends that the Court errone·

ously instructed the jury in the elements of automobile homicide
because the Court instructed the jury that simple negligence was
all that the State needed to prove and appellant contends that
criminal negligence is a necessary element of any homicide offense
in the State of Utah.
The Court in Instruction No. 14 (R. 75) defined automob'.
homicide as defined in Utah Code Ann. §76-5-207 (1953 as amended)

ar.

said that it was sufficient if a person caused the death of another
by operating a vehicle in a negligent manner.

The Court in Instruc:

No. 15 (R. 76) also used in paragraph 4 the term simple negligence
as the necessary element.

Negligence was defined by the Court in

Instruction Nos. 18 and 19 (R. 79, 80).

Appellant excepted to th<

giving of those instructions (R. 472) on the basis that criminal
negligence was necessary.

Appellant offered instructions which
and set
.
defined automobile homicide and required criminal negligence
out the elements of automobile homicide, one of those elements bein'
criminal negligence rather than simple negligence (R. 107' lOB).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Appellant's contention at the time of trial and now is
:hat under our statutes no offense is a criminal offense unless a
person acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or with criminal
negligence or his act constitutes an offense involving strict
liability.

Utah Code Ann. §76-2-101 (1953 as amended).

Further,

appellant was charged with a form of criminal homicide and our
statute, Utah Code Ann. §76-5-201 (1953 as amended) provides that
a person corrrrnits criminal homicide if he intentionally, knowingly,
recklessly, or with criminal negligence unlawfully causes the death
of another.

Criminal Homicide is defined as murder in the first

and second degree, manslaughter, or negligent homicide, or automobile homicide.

Appellant is fully aware that this argument has

been made and rejected by this Court in three previous cases,
State v. Durant, 561 P.2d 1056 (Utah, 1977), State v. Wade, 572 P.2d
398 (Utah, 1977) and State v. Anderson, 561 P.2d 1061 (Utah, 1977).

Appellant contends that the opinions in those cases are and were
erroneous and the dissenting opinion of Justice Maughan in State
v. Durant, supra, is the correct law in the State of Utah, and

should be adopted by this Court and the above three cited cases
should be overruled based upon reasoning set forth by Justice Maughan.
Our statutes are clear in defining offenses and there is a substantial
difference between simple negligence as defined by this Court in
those cases and as defined by the trial court in this matter in its
Instruction Nos. 18 and 19 and in criminal negligence as defined by

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 5 -

our code.
Under the facts of this case where appellant was found
guilty of automobile homicide, it is apparent that the jury found
appellant to be negligent in his driving pattern otherwise appellant
could not have been found guilty.

However, had the jury been

properly instructed that he must have acted with criminal negligence
using the definition of criminal negligence, the jury may not have
found that the risk taken by appellant was of such a nature and
degree that failure to perceive it (namely the red light) constitute:'
a gross deviation from the standard of care than an ordinary person '
would exercise in all the circumstances as viewed from appellant's
standpoint.

That is, it is easy to say in retrospect that a jury

would find going through a red light to be criminal negligence bm
that can only be said because the jury found appellant was negligent·
in apparently going through a red light.

The clear difference

between negligence and criminal negligence could easily have made
a vast difference in the outcome of this case as the evidence of
intoxication was slight or nil as will be discussed in Point II and ,
Point III.
This Court should overrule the decisions in State !'..:.
Durant, supra, State v. Anderson, supra, and State v. Wade, supra,
and follow our statutes as set forth above and adopt the reasoning
of Justice Maughan in his dissenting opinion in State v. Dura!!£,
supra.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT II
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY
ON THE PRESUMPTIONS CREATED BY A BLOOD ALCOHOL
LEVEL ABOVE 0.08 BECAUSE THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE
TO SUPPORT SUCH AN INSTRUCTION.
Appellant contends it was reversible error for the trial
court to instruct the jury on the presumptions created by a certain
blood alcohol level because there was absolutely no evidence to
1

support such an instruction, and such an instruction only confused
and deluded the jury in their deliberations and confused the question
of intoxication.
To convict one of automobile homicide, the State must
prove that a person is under the influence of intoxicating liquor
to a degree which renders the person incapable of safely driving
a vehicle.

Clearly from that the State must prove that at the time

of the driving which allegedly resulted in the death that the person
' was under the influence of alcohol.

The Court so instructed the

jury, but the Court also instructed the jury on the presumptions
created by certain blood alcohol levels.

In Instruction No. 17

(R. 78) the Court instructed the jury that if there was at the

time of driving 0.05% or less by weight of alcohol in appellant's
blood it was presumed he was not under the influence of intoxicating
liquor·

If the blood alcohol level was between 0. 05 and 0. 08 at

the time of the d riving
· ·
· no presumption
·
t h ere is
an d t h e Cour t
instructed in
· paragraph number 3 of Instruction No. 17 t h at i· f
there wa
.
s at the time of driving 0.08% or more by weight of alcohol
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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in appellant's blood it shall be presumed that appellant was under
the influence of intoxicating liquor.

Appellant objected to that

instruction (R. 472) on the basis that there was no evidence to
support such an instruction (R. 473).
In an effort to show appellant's alleged intoxication
the State introduced evidence that appellant's blood was taken at
12:14 a.m. and 12:48 a.m. on July 22, these times being some hour
and a half and two hours after the incident is alleged to have
occurred at 10:45 p.m. on July 21, 1977 (R. 390, 396, 370, 373).
At those times in the early hours of July 22 there was testimony,
objected to (see Point III A) that appellant's blood alcohol level
at those times was 0. 19.

In an effort to "relate back" or "extrapo·

late" those figures back to the relevant time of the accident, 10:4i •
p. m. on July 21 (R. 32) the State called Bryan Finkle, employed
by the University of Utah as a toxicologist and pharmacologist.
He testified at length, taking 32 pages of transcript, about t~
effects of alcohol on the body and about how one can perform such
computations in attempting to figure a blood alcohol level at an
earlier time given the

blood alcohol level at a later time.

He engaged in certain assumptions given him and testified that it
was very important that he know when the last drink occurred before
driving because without that information he could not possibly
know a person's blood alcohol level at a given time (R. 458) · He
assumed, apparently based upon the testimony of Eppie Duran that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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:·Ir. Duran had been with appellant during the evening and appellant

had nothing to drink after 10: 30 p .m. and before that he had a
glass with something in i t (R. 356, 357, 358),

that appellant's

last drink would have been no later than 10:30 p.m. on July 21,

1977.

Given that assumption and other factors which he assumed

he related back to the time of driving, 10: 45 p. m. and said that
appellant's blood alcohol level would have been between 0. 05 and
0.08 (R. 459).

There was no other evidence given as to appellant's

blood alcohol level.

There was no evidence that it was higher than

0.08 at the time of driving, only that it was 0 .19 some one and half

and two hours later and Dr. Finkle described the phenomenon of blood
alcohol level rising to reach a certain peak and then decreasing
linearly over time.

Simply stated there was no evidence that at

the time of driving the blood alcohol level was above 0. 08.

There-

fore, the instruction given by the Court was confusing and erroneous
and was reversible error.
In State v. Chealey, 100 Utah 420, 116 P.2d 377 (1941)
this Court reversed a conviction for involuntary manslaughter based
upon reasons appellant is advancing in this case.

In that case

the Court instructed the jury that it was unlawful for a person to
be driving on a public highway at a speed greater than was reasonable
and prudent and the Court pointed out that there was no evidence in
the State' s case at all, that the defendant in
· that case was driving
· ·
at an excessive speed.
"as a co

The Court pointed out that the instructon

rrect general statement of the law but served no purpose
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in the case and should not have been given because there was no
evidence of the speed that was greater than that which was reasonat>
and prudent.

The Court also instructed the jury that it was U.'llaw-

ful for a person to drive while he was under the influence to such
an extent that his ability to see objects was
in any substantial degree.

diminished

Again the Court pointed out that if the

State's evidence had shown that the defendant was under the influenc:
of intoxicating liquor the instruction would have been correct. Tbe
instruction given by the Court did correctly state the traffic laws
but this Court pointed out that the jury was committed "to go fishi:.;
into fields upon which no evidence was presented".

This Court

reversed the conviction.
In State v. Pacheco, 27 Utah 2d 45, 492 P.2d 1347 (1971),
this Court reversed a conviction for grand larceny because an instru:
tion was given defining aiding and abetting and there was no evidence:
supporting such an instruction.

That was the only point on appeal

and that was the sole basis for this Court's reversing the convictic:
Appellant contends that in this case there the testimonv
was lengthy dealing with this "relation back" testimony as to what
a person's blood alcohol level is at any given time, that it was
particularly troublesome to the jury to decide what to do with
· ny of
Instruction No. 17 of the Court when coupled with the testimo
the so-called experts.

The bottom line of Dr. Finkle' s testimony

was that t h e bl oo d a 1 co h o 1 1 eve 1 at

i-.

t.~e

ti"me of dri·vi·ng was less tha-n

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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o.OS.

An instruction telling them what presumption arises if it

t:: is more than 0. 08 was simply confusing because there was testimony

II

that at other times the blood alcohol level was higher and such
an instruction could do nothing but confuse the jury on this
technical aspect of the case.

Appellant contends that the giving

of such an instruction, properly objected to, was reversible error.

Most significantly, this Court in State v. Bradley,
578 P.2d 1267 (Utah, 1978) held that where the State's evidence
showed a 0.06 blood alcohol level at the time of the test, such
a reading would not have given rise to the presumption

time of the accident.

at the

If the State fails to show the presumption

arises, the Court held, it is error to instruct the jury regarding
the presumptions.
POINT III
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN NOT GRANTING APPELLANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS AT THE END OF THE STATE'S CASE
BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SHOW
APPELLANT WAS UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL.
Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient
to convict him on the charge of automobile homicide and for that
reason the court below erred in not granting appellant's motion to
dismiss made at the end of the State's case (R. 469).

Appellant

contends there was simply no evidence of his intoxication at the
time of driving and of course intoxication is a necessary element
of automobile homicide as the jury was instructed (R. 76) ·

- ll -
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The two officers who initially stopped appellant both
testified that they found him walking rapidly near the scene and
in injured condition (R. 304).

Deputy Frank Smith said that he

smelled the odor of alcohol on appellant (R. 305) but significantlv
. I
was asked for no other observations concerning appellant's condition I
nor gave an opinion as to his state of intoxication.

Deputy Jerry

Rigby also said he smelled the odor of alcohol about appellant
(R. 310) but he was never asked nor gave any opinions nor described
any other observations other than saying appellant appeared to be
"upset" (R. 313).

Two other officers, Kenneth Peay and Arla Wilkins::!
!

of the Utah Highway Patrol, described that they observed appellant
at the hospital from 11: 30 p. m. on July 21 until the tests were
administered at 12: 14 a. m. on July 22 and they said nothing of appellant's
condition and gave no opinions as to his level of intoxication.

I

Evelyn Mayberry, the nurse who took blood samples from appellant on
July 22 at 12:14 a.m. and 12:48 a.m. talked with appellant on those
occasions and gave no opinion and described no behavior indicating
intoxication.

The only person who was asked for any opinion was

Eppie Duran, a friend of appellant's, who was in the car at the time·

.i

of the accident.

He described being with appellant for two and halt ·.

hours before the accident and said that appellant was not unusual
in his activities (R. 368).

No other direct evidence, indeed no

evidence, was proffered as to appellant's state of intoxication.
As discussed in Point II the results of blood tests were a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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dmitted

~to

h

evidence over objection (see Point III A) and Dr. Finkle then

described how at the time of driving the blood alcohol level would
have been O. 05 and 0. 08.

As discussed in Point II appellant claims

the giving of the that instruction was error because that presump!v,
, I

ior.

!

tion created by that ins true ti on was virtually the only evidence that a jury
could find that would lead to a conclusion he was under the influence
of alcohol,

ed

Dr. Finkle described how i!IlIIlediately after taking a

drink one's blood alcohol level would be almost i!IlIIleasurable as the
process of absorbtion from the stomach into the blood stream takes

.ns::! some time and usually does not reach a maximum peak for approximately
45 minutes to one hour.

Therefore, even assuming that appellant

had an alcoholic beverage to drink at 10: 30, and Eppie Duran as
';

described above did say that appellant was drinking something from
a glass at 10:30 p.m., at 10:45 the blood alcohol level would have
been low but could have been higher later at the time of the tests
at 12:14 a.m. and 12 :45 a.m., some one and a half hours and two
hours after the driving and the accident.

This Court has often

stated that it can overturn a verdict on the ground of insufficiency
of the evidence only when the evidence is so without foundation
that reasonable minds must necessarily entertain a reasonable
doubt as to the defendant's guilt.
565 P.2d 66 (Utah, 1977).

See, for example, State v. Wilson,

Clearly in this case there was much

SYmpathy for the child victim and the jury could easily have found
the appell ant ' s driving pattern was way out of line with what shou ld
occur,
However, appellant contends that no reasonable mind could
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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have found that the evidence was sufficient to believe appellant
was under the influence of intoxicating liquor at the time of the
driving to such a degree that he was rendered incapable of safely
driving a vehicle.

Even if he was not safely driving a vehicle it

does not follow that the level of intoxication, if there was one,
is what rendered him incapable of driving.

People operate vehicles

unsafely every day without being under the influence of alcohol and
appellant merely contends that where there was no evidence of intox·
ication the Court should have granted appellant's motion to dismiss
and should not have sent the matter to the jury on that offense.
Because the Court erred in not granting appellant's motion to dismiss
this Court should reverse the conviction and set it aside.
POINT III A
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE
EXHIBITS 11 AND 12, THE RESULTS OF BLOOD TESTS,
BECAUSE THE STATE DID NOT ESTABLISH THE PROBATIVE VALUE OF SUCH TESTS.
Appellant contends that recent legislation compels that
this Court declare the court below erred in allowing into evidence
the blood alcohol test results because the tests were ta k en mo r

e "han
'

one hour after the accident and the State did not prove the probativ~
value of such tests.
Lynn Davis testified, as a chemist, that he analyzed
the blood taken from appellant at 12:14 a.m. and 12:48 a.m. on July
22, 1977, these samples being taken one and a half hours and two
hours after the relevant time of 10:45 p.m. on July 21.
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He was

was allowed to state the results of 0 .19 over objection by appellant
~hat

Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44. 5 (1953 as amended) must first be

complied with (R. 396).

The objection was overruled.

Appellant

moved shortly thereafter for a mistrial based on the admission of
such evidence (R. 399).

The motion was seemingly denied and the

State was told the necessary evidence must be forthcoming.

Following

the testimony of Dr. Finkle, the actual exhibits, ll and 12, were
admitted over objection (R. 460).

These exhibits contained in written

form the 0.19 result.

Appellant submits that all of the above was prejudicial
error by the court below.
been received.

The results and exhibits should not have

As discussed infra in Point II, the State did not

showbyexpert testimony the probative value of the tests at the time
of driving.

Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44.5 (1953 as amended), infra, became

effective July 1, 1977.

L. 1977, Ch. 270, §1.

Appellant contends that the results of chemical tests
were not admissible in the above matter under the law and facts of
this case.

The Auto Homicide Statute (76-5-207) provides in subsection

(2):

(2)
The presumption established by section
41-6-44(b) of the Utah Motor Vehicle Act,
relating to blood alcohol percentages, shall
be applicable to this section and any chemical
test administered on a defendant with his
consent or after his arrest under this section,
whether with or against his consent, shall be
admissible in accordance with the rules of
evidence.
[Emphasis Supplied}
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The Motor Vehicle Act provides as follows:
41-6-44.5. Driving while intoxicated-Chemical tests as evidence--Presumption of
blood alcohol level.--In any action or proceeding in which it is material to prove
that a person was driving under the influence
of alcohol, the results of a chemical test
or tests as authorized in 41-6-44.10 shall
be admitted as evidence if the chemical
test was taken within one hour of the alleged
incident. The level of the alcohol determined
to be in the blood by the chemical test shall
be presumed to be not less than the blood
alcohol level of the person at the time of
the incident. If the chemical test was not
taken within one hour after the alleged
incident, the evidence of the amount of
alcohol in the person's blood as shown by
the chemical test is admissible if expert
testimony establishes its probative value
and the results of said test may be given
prima facie effect if established by expert
testimony.
From these statutes appellant contends it is clear

t~t

the presumptive levels of the Motor Vehicle Act shall apply to an
auto homicide prosecution.

The Motor Vehicle Act in turn says that

in any proceeding in which it is relevant to show a person was under
the influence of alcohol, certain conditions must be met.
auto homicide prosecution it clearly is relevant

to show the person

was under the influence of alcohol at the time of driving that is the key element to the prosecution.

In an

indeed

In State v. Risk, SlO

P.2d 2.5 (Utah, 1974) this Court reversed an auto homicide conviction
ins true tel
because the lower court, before the adoption of 41-6-4 4 .5,
the jury on the presumptions of Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44 (1953) ·
. 1 Act to
Court said if the legislature meant for the Motor Ve h ic e
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Thi;

lv to the criminal code,
ap P .

they should have said so.

Because the

legislature had not "said so" at that time, the error was reversible.
~ow,

the legislature has said in both the criminal code and the

)lotor Vehicle Act that the presumptions apply in auto homicide cases.
In State v. Bradley, supra,

this Court dealt with a case tried before

the effective date of Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44. 5.
in an auto homicide conviction,

The defendant,

claimed the chemical test should not

be admitted unless it was "related back" by expert testimony.

The

Utah Court said that was not the law before the statute, 41-6-44.5,
as without "relation back" testimony the test was admissible but the

weight of the test was for the jury.
~otsay

the statute, 41-6-44.5,

Significantly, the Court did

would not apply to an auto homicide

case, it merely did not apply in that case because of its effective
date.

No expert testimony was given there.

The Court held that where

the blood alcohol level was O. 06, no instructions could be given on
the presumptive level unless expert testimony showed the blood alco!iol level was higher at the time of the incident, in cases arising
before the effective date of Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44.5.

It is

apparent from Bradley, that this Court felt the new statute, 41-6-44.5,
clearly would apply to auto homicide prosecutions and its mandates

I

c

must be obeyed. If no "presumptive level" is shown at the time of
the t
est, expert testimony is necessary. Here, the State's evidence
would show a test result below the 0.08 presumptive level at the
time of d . .

r1v1ng.

Our legislature, in enacting Utah Code Ann.
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§41-6-44.5 (1953) recognized the need for expert testimony in this
area and set a time limit beyond which the test itself would not bt
reliable enough to be admissible without foundation testimony.
Appellant contends that as the test here was not given
within the one hour time limit of Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44.S (1953),
no chemical test results can be admitted unless expert testimony
first is adduced showing the probative value of such a test.

Asar;.

in Point II, there was no such testimony showing the presumption wa:
to be given effect.
POINT IV
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN NOT GRANTING APPELLANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE RESULTS OF THE BLOOD
ALCOHOL ANALYSIS OR ALTERNATIVELY DISMISSING
THE ACTION.
Appellant moved, prior to trial, to suppress the blood
alcohol results of the blood samples taken from him (R. 23).

A

hearing was held before the same judge that tried the case (R. 52).
Evidence was taken and memorandum submitted and appellant's motion
was denied (R. 52).

Appellant claims such a ruling was reversible

error.
Appellant was arrested in the late evening hours of
July 21, 1977.

Samples of his blood were taken on two occasions

in the early hours of July 22, 1977, at approximately 12: 14 a.m.
and 12:48 a.m.

Those samples of blood were removed by a Registereo

Nurse, Evelyn Mayberry.

Those samples of blood were eventuallY turn'

over to Lynn R. Davis, a chemist with the Salt Lake County Health
Department.

An analysis of those specimens were performed by Mr.
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Davis and the specimens were then retained by Mr. Davis in an un-

refrigerated condition in room temperature (R. 495 ) , which conduct
appellant contends is tantamount to the destruction of those physical
specimens for purposes of further analysis and which conduct is
thereby denial of due process of law.
Appellant contends that the act of leaving his blood
specimens at room temperature is tantamount to destroying those
samples.

No allegations of bad faith or improper motives are

but the conduct was clearly not accidental.

made

Appellant contends

that where one of the main elements of the offense is that he was
under the influence of alcohol and where Utah has statutes which
set forth that a person with a blood alcohol content of above 0. 08%
is presumptively under the influence of alcohol (see Utah Code Ann.
!41-6-44) that the blood alcohol level is certainly material to guilt

or innocence and so the destroyed evidence is irretrievably lost to
appellant and he is foreclosed from employing any experts he may
choose to analyze that blood.

The keeping of the specimen in a re-

frigerated condition could easily alleviate such problem.

Appellant

contends that this are of the law, destruction or loss of evidence,
is closely akin to the suppression of evidence favorable to the
accused by the State.

I t is,
·
h owever, a re 1 ative
· 1 y newer area an d

so remedies need to be fashioned based upon the overall circumstances·
Appellant submits that in this case two remedies were possible.
.
smissal of charge which has as an element intoxication,

One

was a di

Count II, and the ot h er is a suppression f rom evi"d ence o f t h e resu lt s
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of the State's tests performed upon appellant's blood.
Several general rules have been developed in the area c:
suppression of favorable evidence.
This Court in State v. Stewart, 544 P.2d 477 (Utah, Bi'
announced the rule governing nondisclosure of evidence favorable

an~

material to criminal defendants:
. (S)uppression or destruction of evidence
by those charged with prosecution, including
police officers, constitutes a denial of due
process if the evidence is material to guilt
or innocence of the defendant in a criminal
case .
Id., at 478
The rule in Stewart is even broader in scope than that
of the leading United States Supreme Court case in the field of
suppression of evidence, Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L.Ed.
2d 215, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963), in which the Court said:
We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused
upon request violates due process where the
evidence is material either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad
faith of the prosecution.
Id., 373 U.S. at 87.
Stewart's extension of the duty to disclose to police
officers has also been approved by the United States Supreme Court
in its opinion in Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 31 L.Ed. Zd
104, 92 S.Ct. 763 (1972):
Moreover, whether the nondisclosure was a :e~~~t
of negligence or design it is the responsibi ity
· an
of the prosecutor. The ' prosecutor's of f'ice is
entity and as such it is the spokesman for the
Government.
Id., 405 U.S. at 154.
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~a

If the police were not burdened with a duty to disclose, the prosec

!~;

an~

cutor could successfully claim that police officers, who did the
principle investigation of a case, had withheld exculpatory information from him, and, therefore, that he had no duty to disclose the
material.

This would leave the defendant with no assertable claim

when his right to a fair trial had been clearly abridged.
~e

To impede

process disclosure in this fashion would effectively abrogate

the fundamental fairness objectives sought by the many constitutional
decisions requiring disclosure of favorable and material evidence
to the defendant.

For this reason:

The police are also part of the prosecution,
and the taint on the trial is no less if
they, rather than the State's Attorney, were
guilty of nondisclosure.
The duty to disclose is that of the State,
which ordinarily acts through the prosecuting
attorney; but if he too is the victim of
police suppression of the material information,
the State's failure is not on that account
excused. We cannot condone an attempt to
connect the defendant with the crime by
questionable inferences which might be
refuted by undisclosed and unproduced
documents in the hands of the police.
Barbee v. Warden, 331 F. 2d 842. 846 (4th
Cir. 1964)
Lynn Davis worked as an agent of law enforcement as the
blood specimens were taken at the request of law enforcement and
analyzed for their purposes.

analysis.
in

~te

The destruction of evidence case is akin to the above
Th"is Court has not dealt with this exact situation, but
v. Stewart, 554 p. 2d 477 (Utah, 1975) this Court did deal
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with a problem similar in nature.

In that case, the defendant was

convicted of Unlawful Distribution of a Controlled Substance and
during the trial there was evidence presented that the undercover
agent who purchased the narcotics had a tape recorder on his person
during the transaction.

That tape was requested during the trial

by defense counsel and the request was denied.

In ruling on that

contention this Court said that:
While it is true that a deliberate suppression
or destruction of evidence by those charged
with the prosecution, including police officers,
constitutes a denial of due process if the
evidence is material to the guilt or innocence
of the defendant in a criminal case, there is
no showing in this case that the material
recorded on the tape in question was vital
to the issue of whether or not the defendant
was guilty of the charge.

This was so, the Court held, because the defendant specifically deni
having made the sale and denied even having seen the undercover wit·
ness on the day the sale was supposedly to have occurred.

This

Court issued guidance in that case when it said:
We think it advisable that those charged with
investigation and prosecution of crime retain
intact all records and other evidence pertaining to the case until it is finally dis- .
posed of.
By adopting such a practice, a claim
of unfairness by one charged with a criminal
offense would be groundless.
Thus, this Court has recognized that a destruction of
evidence that is material to guilt or innocence is a denial of due
process of law.

In that case, however, there was no

would have been beneficial.

s hawing the ta

The defendant there denied completely
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even having met the undercover agent on the date in question.

In

this case, there can be no question but that appellant's blood
aicohol level was relevant to his guilt or innocence of the charge
of automobile homicide.

Given the simple nature of refrigeration

and the small size of blood samples, appellant contends that the
failure to follow the advise of this Court should warrant one of
the remedies sought by the appellant.
In this case, of course, appellant did not show that
the evidence would have been favorable

to him.

Such a burden and

task under the circumstances was obviously completely impossible as
the evidence had been destroyed.

Appellant contends that he need

not "prove" the material would be favorable to him as he would in a
situation where there was evidence merely suppressed, but not
In State v. Brewer, 549 P. 2d 188 (Ariz. App. 1976), the

destroyed.

Court dealt with a conviction in a fraud case.

The defendant alleged

that certain evidence was destroyed prior to the trial which may have
tended to establish his innocence.

The Court examined that contention

and noted that the destroyed documents had been transcribed and that
transcript had been made available to the defendant.

The Court in

discussing the destruction of evidence said that to be in violation
of due process :
The State must know, or have reason to know,
that the evidence being destroyed was either
material or favorable to the accused.

mus. in t h at case, there was no required showing that the material
iie favorabl

e

"f .
it was destroyed.

1

It would be enough if the defendant
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could show either that it was material or favorable and that the
State knew or had reason to know of that materiality.

Appellant

submits that the very nature of the evidence in question must lead
the Court to the conclusion that the State through its agent
knew that the results of the blood test (where intoxication was a
crucial element of the offense) would be material.

This is the

case, appellant contends, where, as the Court said in In Re Cameron,

439 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1968):
The police or prosecution may disable the State
from ever giving a defendant a fair trial if
they have lost or destroyed or otherwise made
unavailable vital defense evidence.
In Cameron, the California Court noted that if such a situation arost
a new trial should not be held, but the defendant should be dischar5t
The State of Washington dealt with a similar case in
State v. Wright, 557 P.2d 1 (Wash, 1976).

In that case the defendant

was convicted of first degree murder for the killing of his wife.
Her badly decomposed body was found in a room and had apparently beei
dead for approximately 3 weeks.

After removing all of the clothing

from the body, due to its highly infected and unpleasant nature,
the police burned all clothing before any analysis for blood or
any other tests were performed.

The police gave permission to a

relative of the deceased to remove and burn the bedding and mattress
and other items from the room.

This was all accomplished before the

defendant had been appointed an attorney

but after he was arrested

and before any scientific tests of any kind were performed.
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In

that case, the defendant prior to trial made a motion to dismiss the
charge on the basis of a denial of due process of law.

The Court

began by discussing "what is material" and reached the inescapable
conclusion that such evidence could have been material, but that it
".as impossible to tell whether or not the evidence would be favor-

able to the defendant because it had been destroyed.

The Court

quoted a leading case in the area, United States v. Bryant, 439 F. 2d
642 (D.C. Cir. 1971).

The Washington Court quoted as follows:

The purpose of the duty [to disclose] is not
simply to correct an imbalance of advantage
whereby the prosecution may surprise the
defense at trial with new evidence; rather,
it is also to make of the trial a search for
truth informed by all relevant material, much
of which, because of imbalance in investigative
resources, will be exclusively in the hands
of the government.
Further, quoting from Bryant, the Court said that:
Before a request for discovery has been made,
the duty of disclosure is operative as a duty
of preservation.

:;.

In Wright, the defendant pointed out several possibilites
for the use of evidence and the Court held that by so doing, he demonstrated a reasonable possiblity that the evidence destroyed by the
police was material to guilt or innocence and favorable.
The Court then went on with the more difficult task
' of fashioning a remedy.
where th
mat

They noted there have been situ ta tions

e prosecution has made "an earnest effort" to preserve the

·

erials, but noted this was not the case. Even though the evidence
·ias n0 t d
·
estoryed for the specific purpose of hindering the defense,
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the motive of the prosecution or the police is not determinative.
The purpose of the duty of preservation "is not to punish the polic;
but to insure a fair trial for the accused".

The Court noted the

destruction was intentional as there was no effort made to preserve
the evidence and further noted that neither "administrative conven·
ience nor inadequate facilities justifies a failure to preserve
potential evidence".
of law.

Therefore, the defendant was denied due proces:

The Court noted that usually in a suppression type case a

new trial can be ordered and the defendant can be given the suppress:.
evidence.

Of course, that is not possible in this case, so the

Court saw no alternative other than to reverse the conviction and
dismiss the charges, then went on to discuss some of the practical
problems that would be created for police and gave suggestions as
how to handle that.
Appellant contends that his case is very much similar
in that the evidence was clearly intentionally not refrigerated
even though there is no contention made that it was done as a purpos<
to hinder defense.

Administrative ease is not a sufficient reason

for denying evidence.

There is no possible way appellant could

have shown that the evidence would have been favorable, but it
was material and it might have been favorable.

clea:~

Appellant contends

the Court should have followed the Wright rationale and held that th<

w and dis·
destruction of such evidence denies h im d ue process Of la
h"im.
·
missed the c h arge against

In not so doi·ng, the Court erred.

Alternatively, appellant's blood alcohol level should have been
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t

suppressed from evidence prior to trial.
In State v. Trimble, 402 P.2d 162 (N.M. 1965) the Court
dealt with a destruction of evidence case much weaker than appellant's.
~

iliat case the defendant, a minister, was convicted of first degree

murder.
defense.

It was defendant's theory at trial that he acted in self

He claimed to have in his possession a letter and some

tapes which he was about to show the victim when the victim attacked
the defendant and necessitated the shooting.

After the shooting

the police obtained a search warrant and obtained the letter and
tapes and thereafter these were never seen again. The defendant
claimed they were helpful to his defense of self defense in that
they would have contained what he said they did and corroborated
his trial testimony.

The State argued that the existence

of the

letter and the tape were explained by defendant on the stand and
his testimony was not con tr averted and so there was no prejudice.
The Court initially began by saying that the situation was similar
to the suppression of favorable evidence by the State, although
not exactly alike.

The Court went on to hold over the argument of

the State that even though the suppression was not willful, the same
rule applies.

The Court noted that the presence and existence of

the letter and its assistance to defendant in corrobrating his version were, "too apparent for argument".

Therefore, under the facts

of the case, the Court had no alternative, but to' reverse and set
aside the sentence.
The situation in this case is like the situation brought
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to light in the California case of People v. Hitch, 527 P.2d 362
(Cal. 1974).

In that case a person was convicted of driving while

1

under the influence of alcohol and the results of a breathalyzer
test were admitted at this trial.

The defendant sought to analyze

the test ampoules which had been used while the breath test had bee"
given by police officers.

Those had been destroyed after the test

by the police officer. The California Court

began its analysis and saii

that the results of such test clearly constitute material evidence
and went on to say that evidence:
Substantially affecting the credibility of
the results of the test would appear to be
material and the suppression of such evidence
would deny defendant a fair trial.
They noted, of course, that the critical evidence was not before
them so it was not for the Court to determine whether the evidence
was or was not favorable to the issue of the defendant's guilt or
innocence.

The Court likened the situation in that case to a sit·

uation where an undercover informant is known by the police on a
drug sale, but the name is not revealed for the defendant to locate
and interview the witness.

The Court noted that in those situations

where the defendant has shown a reasonable possibility that the in·
formant could give favorable evidence his identity must be disclosed
or the case dismissed.

Sl.·mi.·larly

'

the Court i.·n Hi·tch sai'd that given

the availability of the test ampoule and its contents there is a
reasonable possibility that it would constitute favorable evidence
on the issue of guilt or innocence and if that is shown then such
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evidence must be disclosed.
must be disclosed.

If the evidence was available, it clearly

The Court in that case gave prospective effect

only to their rule because of the immensity of cases dealing with
a breathalyzer and test ampoules in California alone.

The rule

to be followed would be that the test results would be suppressed
on the part of the State if the evidence were not preserved and
discover ab le by defense.
In fashioning a remedy appellant contends that the
Court should have weighed the significance of the lost or destroyed
evidence and the conduct which lead to that destruction.

Further,

the Court should have considered the ease or difficulty of retaining
such evidence in determining what remedy ought to apply.

Thus,

in this case, we have a situation where a person certainly knowledgable in the area of blood analysis, knew that by failing to refrigerate the specimen, the specimen would be forever lost to further
analysis.

The method of maintaining the evidence simply would have

been to place the samples in refrigeration.

The evidence and

materiality has already been discussed and is, as the Court in
!E_imble, said,

"too apparent for argument".

Balancing these

factors appellant contends that the Court should reverse the lower
court.
The evidence that was destroyed should not have been
admitted for other reasons (see Point III A) but appellant submits
it was error to allow the State to use such evidence at all when

he is not

·
given a fair opportunity to utilize independent experts.
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POINT V
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN COMMITTING APPELLANT TO
PRISON IN APPELLANT'S ABSENCE.
Appellant contends that he was entitled to be present
when he was conunitted to the Utah State Prison and that the procedur
used by the Court was in error and appellant is entitled to be resentenced.
After the jury verdict of guilty was returned on March

29, 1978 (R. 55, 56),

appellant was referred to the Adult Probation

and Parole Department for a pre-sentence report and sentencing was
set for April 14, 1978.
conflicting events.

On that date there are entries reflecting

The written and signed Order of the Court

(R. 149) reflects that the appellant was referred to the Division
of Corrections for a period not exceeding 90 days, it appearing
that imprisonment may be appropriate in this case.

The Division

of Corrections was requested to retain custody of the appellant
principally at the Utah State Prison and be returned for sentencing
on July 14, 1978.

The minute entry date April 14, 1978 (R. 140) •

indicates that appellant was sentenced to be imprisoned in the Utah
State Prison for zero to five years and a stay of execution was
granted to July 14 for sentencing.

The minute entry also shows

appellant was to undergo a 90 day evaluation at the Utah State
Prison.

On July 14 both the minute entry (R. 155) and the written

· d"icates t h at there was to be a further
order of the Court ( R. 156) in

90 day evaluation at any appropriate place in the discretion of
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Ur!

the Division of Corrections and the appellant was to be returned to
Court for sentencing on October 13, 1978.

On August 16, 1978, a

bmch warrant was issued for appellant (R. 160) seemingly on the
basis that appellant absconded from his second 90 day evaluation
which was being performed at Odyssey House (R. 159).

On October 27,

1978, the minute entry reflects that there was already an outstanding
bench warrant and appellant was connnitted to the Utah State Prison
"as heretofore sentenced".

The minute entry reflects that appellant

was personally not present (R. 165).

That date connnitment was

issued to the Utah State Prison (R. 166).
Appellant contends that the order of October 27, 1978,
committing appellant to Utah State Prison "as heretofore sentenced"
was unlawful and erroneous.

Utah Code Ann. §76-3-404(2) (1953 as

amended) :
Any connnitment for a pre-sentence investigation
under this section shall not constitute a
commitment to prison.
Appellant contends that under that statute and under the written orders
of the Court of both July 14, 1978 and April 14, 1978 appellant was

not sentenced to the Utah State Prison as a referral to the Divison
of Corrections for a 90 day evaluation does not constitute a commit-

ment to prison.

The minute entry of April 14, 1978 lends some con-

fusion and appellant contends that the written or d er o f t h e Court
should govern and ;f
·
·
~
a cormnitment is to i.ssue
to t h e Uta h St a t e P rison
appellant is entitled to be present at that critical stage of the
Proceeding.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 31 -

Utah Code Ann. §77-35-3 (1953) says that for the purposes of judgment if the conviction is for a felony the defendant
must be personally present.

This Court in State v. Fedder, 1 Utah

2d 117, 262 P.2d 753 (1953) has held that even though the Court
cormnitted no error it must use whatever means are available in
bringing defendant before the Court for pronouncement of judgment.
That case has not been altered since 1953 and appellant contends
that while it might be an extremely hollow victory he is entitled
to be present when he is committed to the Utah State Prison.

This

Court should declare that the procedure employed by the trial court
in this case, of saying the words "you are committed to prison" and
then sending someone for a 90 day evaluation in the custody of
the Division of Corrections is not judgment being imposed because
our statute says specifically that a referral to the Division
of Corrections is not a commitment to prison.

Therefore, appellant

contends that this Court should hold the procedure employed by the
trial court erroneous and unlawful and remand the matter so that
appellant may be properly sentenced if his other points on appeal
are not well taken.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above stated, that the evidence did no:
prove a necessary element of the offense, that the jury was imprope:.
.
d t h at s h ou ld have been supprei'
instructed, t h at evi d ence was a d mitte
f llV
and that appellant was improperly sentenced, appellant respect u ·
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submits the convcition should be reversed, or in the alternative
appellant should receive a new trial, or alternatively appellant
should be properly sentenced.
Respectfully submitted,

BRUCE C. LUBECK
Attorney for Appellant
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